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Abstract
Network attacks are serious concerns in today’s increasingly interconnected society. Recent studies have applied
conventional machine learning to network attack detection by learning the patterns of the network behaviors and
training a classification model. These models usually require large labeled datasets; however, the rapid pace and
unpredictability of cyber attacks make this labeling impossible in real time. To address these problems, we proposed
utilizing transfer learning for detecting new and unseen attacks by transferring the knowledge of the known attacks.
In our previous work, we have proposed a transfer learning-enabled framework and approach, called HeTL, which can
find the common latent subspace of two different attacks and learn an optimized representation, which was invariant
to attack behaviors’ changes. However, HeTL relied on manual pre-settings of hyper-parameters such as relativeness
between the source and target attacks. In this paper, we extended this study by proposing a clustering-enhanced
transfer learning approach, called CeHTL, which can automatically find the relation between the new attack and
known attack. We evaluated these approaches by stimulating scenarios where the testing dataset contains different
attack types or subtypes from the training set. We chose several conventional classification models such as decision
trees, random forests, KNN, and other novel transfer learning approaches as strong baselines. Results showed that
proposed HeTL and CeHTL improved the performance remarkably. CeHTL performed best, demonstrating the
effectiveness of transfer learning in detecting new network attacks.
Keywords: Network attacks detection, Machine learning, Transfer learning

1 Introduction
In recent years, cyber attack is a growing serious concern
due to its increased sophistication and variations, such
as denial-of-service (DoS) tactics and the zero-day attack,
posing a great threat to government, military, and industrial networks. Conventional signature-based detection
approaches may fail to address the increased variability
of today’s cyber attacks. Developing novel anomaly detection techniques to better learn, adapt, and detect threats
in diverse network environments becomes essential.
Machine learning/data mining approaches have been
applied to the attack detection in networked environments to improve the detection rate [1–4]. Data-driven
supervised models achieved better accuracy than unsupervised approaches but relied on a large number of
labeled malicious samples [5]. As attacks evolved by
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varying their behaviors, the distributions of feature may
change, making the trained models work poorly [6] and
unable to detect the new attacks. This is a domain-shift
problem, which usually needs recollecting new training
data and retraining the model to adapt to the changes in
the target domain. However, collecting sufficient labeled
data for such continuously rising attack variants is infeasible. Further, detecting evolving attacks usually needs
incorporating new features from various network layers
[7]. This also needs to retrain the model because of the
different feature dimensions.
To address the above problems, we proposed using
transductive transfer learning to enhance the detection of
new threats [6]. Transductive transfer learning, a novel
machine learning technique, can adapt features in a target
domain with deficient labeled data by transferring learned
knowledge from a related source domain [8]. The intuition behind is the human’s transitive inference ability to
extending what has been learned in one domain to a new
similar domain [9]. Our study is motivated by the fact that
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most network attacks belong to variants of known network attack families and share common traits in features
[6, 10], which suggested a good fit for applying transfer
learning.
In this study, source and target domain data refers to
the same network environment at a different time. We
assumed that attacks in a source domain are already
known and labeled, and attacks in a target domain are
new and different than the source. We formularized the
problem by using source domain data to differentiate new
attacks in the target domain. Previously, we developed a
transfer learning-enabled detection framework and proposed a feature-based heterogeneous transfer learning,
called HeTL [6], to detect unseen variants of attacks.
HeTL can find new feature representations for source
and target domain by transforming them on a common
latent space. Nevertheless, we observed that the performance of HeTL depended on manual pre-settings of
a hyper-parameter: relevance between the source and
target domain [6]. In this paper, we proposed another
approach—a hierarchical transfer learning algorithm with
clustering enhancement, called CeHTL, which can cluster source and target domain and compute the relevance
between them.
We utilized a benchmark network intrusion dataset
NSL-KDD [11]. To stimulate the domain shift, we generated training and testing datasets by sampling attacks
from different types of attacks, from big category of
attacks (e.g., DoS, R2L), and also the subcategory of
attacks (i.e., 22 subtypes). We compared the proposed
CeHTL with HeTL [6], as well as any other baselines,
including traditional classification without transfer learning and several novel transfer learning approaches. We
also evaluated the approaches on imbalanced datasets,
which is common in real-world cyber attack practice. We
performed sensitivity analysis by tuning parameters and
using different sizes of training set. The results showed
that CeHTL demonstrated the most stable results, which
means that it does not rely on the pre-setting of parameters and thus is more effective in detecting unknown
attacks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2
reviews the related work. Section 3 outlines the transfer learning framework. Section 4 describes the proposed
approaches. Section 6 presents the experiments, evaluations, and discussions. Finally, we conclude the work in
Section 7.

[12] proposed a methodology to craft traffic with different characteristics. Other studies [13, 14] focused on
how to find effective signatures. However, one major limitation of the signature-based technique is its failure to
detect new attacks, as their signatures are unknown to the
system. In addition, building new signatures needs manual inspection by human experts, which is very expensive
and time-consuming, and also introduces an important
latency between the discovery of a new attack and the
construction of its signature.
Another type of technique for network attack detection is the supervised learning-based technique, which
uses instances of known attacks to build a classification model that distinguishes attacks from good programs
[1, 3]. Nari and Ghorbani [15] present a network behavioral modeling approach for malware detection and
malware family classification. Rafique et al. [16] evaluated the evolutionary algorithms for classification of
malware families through different network behaviors.
Iglesias and Zseby [17] focused on the feature selection
approach to improve the performance of network-based
anomaly detection. However, these learning-based techniques share the same limitation as the signature-based
detection in that they both perform poorly on new attacks.
Since different attacks usually have different distributions
of network behaviors, the learned patterns are unable to
work accurately. A significant advantage of our approach
is its ability to identify an unknown attack that has not
been previously investigated.
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2 Related work
2.1 Network attack detection

One of the well-known techniques for network attack
detection is signature-based detection, which is based on
an extensive knowledge of the particular characteristics
of each attack, referred to as its “signature.” One study

2.2 Transfer learning

Transfer learning was designed to use knowledge from
the source domain, which has sufficient labeled data, to
help build more precise models in a related, but different, domain with only a few or no labeled data. Transfer
learning approaches can be mainly categorized into three
classes [18]. The first class is instance-based [19, 20],
which assumes that certain parts in the source data can
be reused for the target domain by re-weighting related
samples. Dai et al. [20] introduced a boosting algorithm,
TrAdaBoost, which iteratively re-weighted the source
domain data and the target domain data to reduce the
effect of “bad” source data while encouraging the “good”
source data to contribute more to the target domains.
However, these approaches require a lot of labeled samples from the target domain. The second class can be
viewed as model-based approaches [21, 22], which assume
both source and target tasks share some parameters or
priors of their models. The third class of transfer learning
approaches is feature-based [23–25], where a new feature representation is learned from the source and the
target domain and is used to transfer knowledge across
domains. Shi et al. [26] proposed a heterogeneous transfer
learning method, called HeMap, to project the source and
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target domain onto latent subspace via linear transformations. They assumed the subspace is orthogonal. Pan et al.
[24] have performed transfer component analysis (TCA)
to reduce the distance between domains by projecting
the features onto a shared subspace. Nam et al. [27] then
applied TCA to the software defect detection problem.
Sun et al. [23] proposed an approach, called Correlation
Alignment (CORAL), to project source data onto target
data by aligning the second-order statistics of the source
and target distributions, which do not need any labeled
data from the target domain. The work has been applied
to the object detection problem and achieves good results.
Shi et al. first proposed a state-of-the-art approach called
HeMap [26], which uses spectral embedding to unify the
different feature spaces of the target and source datasets,
and applies this approach to image classification.
2.3 Transfer learning for network attack detection

Even though transfer learning has many great applications
in natural language processing and visual recognition
[25, 28], not many studies have applied it to the network
attack detection problem. Bekerman et al. [4] mentioned
that transfer learning can improve robustness in detecting
unknown malware between non-similar environments.
However, they did not present much detailed and formal
work on this idea. The study in [29] applied an instancebased transfer learning approach in network intrusion
detection. However, they require plenty of labeled data
from target domain. Gao et al. [30] proposed a modelbased transfer learning approach and apply it to the
KDD99 cup network dataset. Both of these instance and
model-based transfer learning approaches depend heavily on the assumption of homogeneous features. This is
often not the case for network attack detection, which typically exhibits heterogeneous features. Another advantage
of feature-based approaches is its flexibility to adopt different base classifiers according to different cases, which
motivated us to derive a feature-based transfer learning
approach for our network attack detection study. To our
best knowledge, this paper is the first effort in applying
a feature-based transfer learning approach for improving
the robustness of network attack detection.

3 Framework of using transfer learning for
detecting new network attacks
We have present a transfer learning-enabled network
attack detection framework to enhance detecting new
network attacks in a target domain in [6]. From a practical standpoint, source and target domains can represent
different or the same network environments with different attacks captured at different times and at separate
instances. In this study, we primarily consider the latter
scenario, wherein the source and target domains comprise different attacks. We assume that the attack in the
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source domain is known and labeled appropriately, and
attacks in the target domain are new and not labeled.
Unlike prior studies [29, 30] assuming that the source and
target domains should have the same feature sets, our
framework supports introducing new features into the target domain. This is relevant to evolving network attacks
where the adversary may change their behaviors, resulting
in a need to incorporating new features in the network or
system layers. Thus, in this scenario, the source and target domains have different attack distributions or feature
sets. The goal of the transfer learning framework is to use
source domain data to differentiate new attacks from the
target domain.
The framework consists of a machine learning pipeline,
which includes the following stages: (i) extracting features
from raw network traffic data, (ii) learning representations
with feature-based transfer learning, and (iii) classification. In the first stage, features are extracted from the
raw network trace data with a statistic calculation of
the network flow. Second, we used feature-based transfer
learning algorithms to learn a good new feature representation from both source and target domains. Then, we fed
the new representation to a common base classifier. The
choice of a common base classifier can be decision trees,
SVM, and KNN.

4 Transfer learning approach via spectral
transformation
We model the network attack detection as a binary classification problem, which is to classify each network connection as a malicious or as normal connection. Suppose
we are provided
with source domain training examples

S = xi , x ∈ Rm that have labels LS = {yi }, and target domain data T = {ui }, u
 ∈ Rn . Suppose x and u

are drawn from different distributions, PS (X)  = PT (X),
where PT (X) is unknown, and the dimensions of x and u

are different, Rm  = Rn . Our goal is to accurately predict
the labels on T.
Since network attacks share similar traits, our approach
is to find the common latent subspace and transform
the source and target data onto it to get new feature
representations, which can then be used in classifcation.
We demonstrated the approach in our previous paper
[6]. Given source domain data and target domain data
with different attacks, the model explores the common
latent space, in which the original structure of the data is
preserved while the discriminative examples are still far
apart.
4.1 Optimization

Given source data S and target data T, we compute an
optimal projection of S and T onto an optimal subspace VS and VT according to the following optimization
objective:
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(1)

target domains (β). Inappropriate choice of parameters
might lead to suboptimal efficacy results. The row order
of the class type for S and T could also affect the results of
D(VS , VT ). Practically, we may know little about the new
attack in T, so the transformation process in (4) could be
misleading.
To address this problem, we proposed a hierarchical transfer learning with clustering enhancement, called
CeHTL, through automatically finding the relevance
between the source and target domain before we perform the projection. CeHTL first clustered the instances
for the target domains, as the source domain already has
two natural clusters (classes). By computing the similarity
of each cluster and choosing the mapping for two similar clusters in the source and target domains, we can get
the correspondence (mapping) of each cluster in the target domain to the source domain. We sorted the instances
by order of their cluster labels, so that the rows in matrices T and S will have the same class order. Then, we solved
objective (4) for the ordered T and S. We illustrated the
comparison between CeHTL with HeTL in Fig. 1. The
algorithm for CeHTL is listed in Algorithm 1. We chose
K-means++ [31] for clustering and used the Euclidean
distance to compute the similarity.

min (VS , S) + (VT , T) + βD(VS , VT ),

VS ,VT

where (∗, ∗) is a distortion function that evaluates the difference between the original data and the projected data.
D(VS , VT ) denotes the difference between the projected
data of the source and target domains. β is a trade-off
parameter that controls the similarity between the two
datasets.
Thus, the first two elements of (1) ensure that the projected data preserve the structures of the original data as
much as possible.
We defined D(VS , VT ) in terms of l(∗, ∗) as:
D(VS , VT ) = VT − VS 2

(2)

which is the difference between the projected target
data and the projected source data. Hence, the projected
source and target data are constrained to be similar by
minimizing the difference function (2).
We applied linear transformation to finding the projected space. We define (∗, ∗) as follows:
(VS , S) = S−VS PS 2 , (VT , T) = T−VT PT 2 , (3)
where VS and VT are achieved by a linear transformations
with linear mapping matrices, denoted as PS ∈ Rk×m
and PT ∈ Rk×n to the source and target, respectively.
X2 is the Frobenius norm that can also be expressed
as a matrix trace norm. In a different view, PS T ∈ Rm×k
and PT T ∈ Rn×k project the original data S and T into a
k-dimensional latent
subspace, where the projected data

are comparable (VS , S) = SPS T − VS 2 . This will lead
to a trivial solution PS = 0, VS = 0. We thus apply
(3). It can be viewed as a matrix factorization problem,
which is widely known as an effective tool to extract latent
subspaces while preserving the original data structures.
4.2 Optimization objective 1

Substituting (3) and (2) into (1), we obtain the following optimization objective to minimize with regard to
VS , VT , PS and PT as follows:
min G(VS , VT , PS , PT ) = min S − VS PS 2
+ T−VT PT 2

(4)
2

+ β · VT − VS  )
In our previous work [6], we used a gradient method to
get the global minimums by iteratively fixing three of the
matrices to solve the remaining one until convergence.
The detailed HeTL algorithm was presented in [6].

5 Clustering-enhanced hierarchical transfer
learning
In previous study, we have observed that the performance of HeTL depends on the manual presetting of
a hyper-parameter—relevance between the source and

Algorithm 1: Clustering Enhanced Hierarchical
Transfer Learning (CeHTL)
Input: T, S
Output: Tnew , Snew
1 Initialize: c clusters for each domain, c = 2
2 CT = kmeans(T, c); %CT is the cluster label for each
instance.
3 CS = YS ;%CS is the cluster label for each instance. YS is
the class label for source domain
4 If the dimensions of T and S is not equal,
5 T = pca(T); S = pca(S);
6 Compute the Euclidean distance between centroid of
each cluster in T and S.
7 For each cluster in T, choose the similar cluster from
CS , which has the smallest Euclidean distance value, to
form a similar cluster pair, and assign the same label to
each similar pair of clusters.
8 Sort the matrices [ T, CT ] and[ S, CS ] in the order of
CT and CS , to get the Tnew , Snew for the new input for
the HeTL algorithm.

In case that the source and target domains have heterogeneous feature sets, where T and S may have different
dimensions, the Euclidean distance cannot be applied.
To overcome this problem, we use principal component
analysis (PCA) [32] for each source and target domain
to perform feature reduction. By choosing the same size
of components for source and target domains, they will
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have the same dimensions. The notation description are
presented in Table 1.

6 Experimental evaluation
In this section, we evaluated the performance the of proposed transfer learning HeTL and CeHTL for detecting
“unknown” network attacks. We addressed the following
questions: Does transfer learning approach provide any
advantage compared with a single classifier without using
transfer learning approach? and Which technique is the
most appropriate transfer learning approach? We utilized
a benchmark network intrusion dataset—the NSL-KDD
benchmark dataset [11] (in Section 6.1). We carried out
two experiments to stimulate the “unknown” network
attacks and different feature spaces (in Section 6.2). We
demonstrated the benefits of HeTL and CeHTL compared
Table 1 Notation descriptions
Notations Descriptions
S

Source data

VS

Projected source data

PS

Projection function to the source space

T

Target data

VT

Projected target data

PT

Projection function to the target space

β

Weights of the relevance between the source and target data

k

Dimensions of the projected space

α
Step

to other traditional machine learning algorithms as well
as other several novel transfer learning methods (in
Section 6.3). We also performed the parameter sensitivity analysis and showed the impact of imbalanced datasets
and training data sizes (Section 6.4).
6.1 Network datasets

NSL-KDD contains network features extracted from a
series of TCP connection records captured from a local
area network. Each record in the dataset corresponds to
a connection labeled as either an normal or attack type.
The dataset has 22 different types of attack, which can
be grouped into 4 main categories: DoS, R2L, Probe, and
User to root (U2R). Tables 2 and 3 provide the details of
the attacks and their distribution in the training dataset.
Since the portion of U2R is very small, we only focus on
DoS, R2L, and Probe.
NSL-KDD contains 41 network features that can be split
into 3 groups: (1) basic features deduced from TCP/IP
connection packet headers; (2) traffic features, usually
extracted by flow analysis tools; and (3) content features,

Table 2 Category of the attack in NSL-KDD
Main categories

Attack

DoS

Neptune, back, land, smurf, teardrop,pod

R2L

buffer_overflow, ftp_write, guess_passwd, imap,
multihop, phf, spy, warezclient, warezmaster

Learning rates

Probe

ipsweep, nmap, portsweep, satan

Learning step

U2R

loadmodule, perl, rootkit
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Table 3 Number of instances in NSL-KDD
Class

Instances

Percentage

Normal

67343

53.46

DoS

45927

36.46

R2L

995

0.79

Probe

11656

9.25

U2R

52

0.04

requiring the processing of the packet content. Some
example of features are listed in Table 4.
6.2 Experimental setting
6.2.1 Detection of unknown network attacks

This experiment is to evaluate the proposed transfer
learning approaches for detecting new variants of attacks.
Stimulating new attacks is challenging. We can assume
attacks in the target data has no labels and differ from
attacks in the source domain. We randomly selected malicious examples from one main attack category (e.g., DoS,
R2L, Probe) and normal examples as the source domain.
Then, we chose a different attack type combined with
normal samples for the target domain. We finally generated three groups: DoS→Probe (DoS is the source domain
for training and Probe is target domain for testing),
DoS→R2L and Probe→R2L). To evaluate the generalization, we also chose attacks from 22 sub-attack types
for each source and target set and generated 11 tasks.
We repeated the processes ten times and reported the
averages and standard deviations. We make the attack
data, and the normal data in each domain are balanced
unless stated otherwise. We further studied the effects of
imbalanced data in Section 6.4.
6.2.2 Network attacks with different feature spaces

To evaluate the performance in detecting attacks using
different feature spaces, we used different feature sets for
source and target domains, based on the first experiment
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setting. In network security, there are circumstances that
we need to incorporate new features to better detect
the attacks. For example, traffic feature is more distinguishable for DoS attack. However, for the R2L attack,
the content feature is more distinguishable. This usually
need to retrain the model. To stimulate this scenario, we
selected the most relative features for the source and target domains using information gain, resulting in unequal
feature dimensions. The final selected features were listed
in Appendix Tables 5 and 6. Of note, using information
gain here is only for generating different feature sets, not
for improving the performance. In real practice, features
can be changed due to the manual feature engineering
as we have less information about the target dataset. The
baseline approach manually mapping the target data into
the source feature space and applied the traditional classifiers. We compared our transfer learning approach with
the baselines.
6.3 Evaluation

We chose the accuracy, F1 score (F − Measure) and
receiver operating characteristic curve (ROC curve) as the
performance metrics. F1 score combines precision and
recall to measure the per-class performance of classification or detection algorithms.
We firstly chose C4.5 decision tree (CART), linear
SVM, and KNN as the baselines, which were also served
for base classifiers for HeTL and CeHTL. We compared HeTL and CeHTL with baselines on three main
transfer learning tasks (i.e., DoS→Probe, DoS→R2l, and
Probe→R2L). Figures 2 and 3 show the box plots of accuracy and F1 score on ten iterations on three main tasks.
We observed that the baseline models performed poorly,
with accuracy of 0.47–0.74 and F1 score of 0.1–0.65.
Our HeTL and CeHTL significantly outperformed the
baselines, obtained over 0.70 accuracy and 0.75 F1 score.
CeHTL outperformed HeTL with all three base classifiers in DoS→Probe and in decision tree and KNN in

Table 4 Some selected features in NSL-KDD
Feature name

Description

Feature category

Duration

Duration of the connection

Basic features

Src_bytes

Data bytes from source to destination

Basic feature

Dst_bytes

Data bytes from destination to source

Basic feature

Num_failed_logins

Number of incorrect login in a connection

Content feature

Srv_count

Sum of connections to the same destination port number

Traffic feature

Serror_rate

Percentage of connections that have “SYN” errors among the connections to the same
host in the past 2 s

Traffic feature

Srv_serror_rate

Percentage of connections that have “SYN” errors among the connections to the same
destination port in the past 2 s

Traffic feature

Dst_host_count

Sum of connections to the same destination IP address

Traffic feature

Dst_host_same_srv_rate

The percentage of connections that were to the same service, among the connections
aggregated in dst_host_count

Traffic feature

(2019) 2019:1
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Probe→R2L. CeHTL achieved the best result with an
average accuracy and F1 score of 0.88.
Then, we applied HeTL, CeHTL, and two baseline
methods—SVM and HeMap [26], a novel transfer learning approach—to the 11 transfer learning tasks generated
by the subtypes of attacks, along with the 3 main tasks. We
run the experiment for 10 iterations with different random
seeds and reported the average and standard deviations
of accuracy and F1 scores in Figs. 4 and 5. We observed
(1) transfer learning approaches outperformed the traditional classifiers without using transfer learning in all 14
tasks, (2) HeTL and CeHTL can improve the accuracy to
0.8–0.9 in 5 tasks, (3) HeTL and CeHTL outperformed
HeMap, and (4) CeHTL outperformed all other methods
in 10 cases. Figure 6 shows the ROC curves on 3 main
transfer learning tasks using KNN as the base classifier. CeHTL achieved the best area under ROC curves
(AUC) in 2 DoS→Probe and Probe→R2L (CeHTL 0.93
and 0.91 AUC vs. HeTL 0.82 and 0.65 AUC). Besides
HeMap, we compared our approaches with more baselines, TCA [24] and CORAL [23]. Figure 7 showed the
results of approaches on 5 classifiers in DoS→R2L. HeTL
and CeHTL outperformed all baselines.
Finally, we carried out the second experimental setting, where the source domain and target domain have
dos_vs_probe

different feature spaces. We compare the transfer learning approach with the manual mapping approach on
DoS→R2L. From the results shown in Fig. 8, we can see
that the transfer learning approaches outperformed the
baselines.
6.4 Discussion

The study proposed two transfer learning methods, HeTL
and CeHTL, on network attack detection methods to
address the issues of lacking sufficient labels for new
attacks. The results showed that HeTL and CeHTL significantly improved the accuracy compared to the traditional
classifiers and other transfer learning methods. Especially,
CeHTL performed the best in most of the tasks, especially in DoS→Probe tasks. One of the reason is DoS had
more similarities with Probe than R2L, according to the
top selected features in Appendix Table 5 and 6. This can
improve the accuracy of computing the cluster correspondence, which thus resulted in a better performance.
6.4.1 Parameter sensitivity

Two hyper-parameters, the similarity confidence parameter β and the dimensions of the new feature space k,
need to be set for optimization (4). There are several
ways to determine the optimum hyper-parameters: (a) the
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the similarity confidence parameter β, as shown in Fig. 10,
CeHTL shows a significant improvement and stays stable
from β ≥ 0, because the correspondence has been automatically computed and involved in the transfer learning,
so β should be set larger than 0. For the parameter k,
in general, CeHTL shows an outstanding and stable performance than other approaches. The results show that
CeHTL is more suitable for unknown network detection
since we can empirically set the parameters and do not
reply heavily on information about the labeled data in the
target domain.

similarity confidence β can be determined by computing
the similarity or distance between the source and target
data, (b) the optimal number of both parameters can be
found by enumerating the number of parameters, or (c)
the parameters can be set empirically. However, the first
and second approaches need a few labeled data from the
target domain, which is not a truly “unknown” situation.
We studied the impact of different parameter settings on
the performance of detecting attacks. Figure 9 demonstrates the effect on accuracy by using different parameter
combinations of β and k (where β ∈[ 0, 1] and k ranges
from 1 to 6). Figures 10 and 11 demonstrate the average
accuracy achieved on parameters β and k.
Compared with HeMap, both HeTL and CeHTL
improve the highest accuracy achieved with different
parameter settings, shown in Fig. 9. However, HeTL is
sensitive to parameter tuning, showing lower accuracy in
some specific parameter combinations. CeHTL performs
more stably. For example, in DoS→Probe, after several
fluctuation, CeHTL can maintain around 0.8 accuracy. For

6.4.2 The imbalanced data effects

In many real cases, the size of normal and attack data
would be not equal. Thus, we investigated the performance of the HeTL and CeHTL on imbalanced data.
Figure 12 shows the F1 score of the transfer learning approaches and baselines in different percentage
of the attack data. We observed the baseline method
performed poorly on the imbalanced data, especially
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in DoS→R2L and Probe→R2L. The transfer learning
approaches improved F1 scores in most cases. Although
all the methods had a lower F1 score in 10% attack data,
HeTL and CeHTL boosted the F1 by 50% when adding
another 10% of attack data, and the metric kept rising with
increasing the attack data.
6.4.3 The training size

We studied how much training data was needed for
unknown attack detection. We plot the learning curves in
Fig. 13. From the results, we observed that CeHTL gained
the best accuracy at a 500 sample size in DoS→Probe and
DoS→R2L, and the second best accuracy in Probe→R2L.
CeHTL needs the smallest training sample size, which
makes it the best option given a limited amount of training
data.

7 Conclusion
Machine learning have been employed in detecting the
occurrence of malicious attacks. Most machine learning
techniques for attack detection are effective only given the
assumptions that the training and testing data are from

dos vs probe

1.0

1.0

the same distribution. However, in most real cases, continuously evolving attacks and the lack of sufficient labeled
datasets hinder the ability of supervised learning techniques to detect new attacks. In this paper, we introduced
a feature-based transfer learning framework and transfer
learning approaches. We presented a feature-based transfer learning approach using a linear transformation, called
HeTL. We also proposed a cluster enhanced transfer
learning approach, called CeHTL, to make it more robust
in detecting unknown attacks. We evaluated the transfer
learning approaches on common classifiers. The results
showed the transfer learning approaches improve the performance of detecting unknown network attacks compared to baselines. Spectacularly, CeHTL exhibited higher
performance and the ability to be more robust in detecting unknown attacks with no labeled data. The results also
demonstrated that the proposed transfer learning techniques can support different feature spaces. In the future,
we aim to apply the model to various attack domains, such
as malware detection. We also plan to combine transfer
learning with deep learning to pre-train the models for
practical use.
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Table 5 Top features for detecting DoS, used in the second
experiment
Rank index

Features

Score

1

srv_serror_rate

0.504

2

serror_rate

0.500

3

flag

0.475

4

dst_host_srv_serror_rate

0.441

5

src_bytes

0.426

6

logged_in

0.417

7

dst_host_serror_rate

0.392

8

diff_srv_rate

0.383

9

dst_bytes

0.334

10

same_srv_rate

0.279

11

service

0.181

12

dst_host_diff_srv_rate

0.173

13

dst_host_same_srv_rate

0.162

14

wrong_fragment

0.161

15

dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate

0.150

16

dst_host_srv_count

0.150

17

count

0.138

18

dst_host_count

0.136

19

srv_diff_host_rate

0.135

20

duration

0.115

Table 6 Top features for detecting R2L, used in the second
experiment
Rank index

Features

Score

1

srv_count

0.399

2

count

0.326

3

dst_host_srv_count

0.307

4

service

0.283

5

dst_bytes

0.243

6

src_bytes

0.231

7

hot

0.225

8

is_guest_login

0.215

9

protocol_type

0.208

10

srv_diff_host_rate

0.176

11

dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate

0.175

12

dst_host_same_src_port_rate

0.162

13

num_failed_logins

0.154

14

dst_host_count

0.127

15

flag

0.104
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